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The Law Must Reflect the New
Image of Women
By MARTHA W GRIFFITHS*
TRADITIONALLY our society has viewed men as providers and
women as homemakers; men as protectors and women as those in
need of protection; men as leaders and women as followers. The law
has reflected this view of women but the image no longer fits the facts.
Dramatic changes in American life style have created new roles
and a new image for women. Today women are considerably more
likely to finish high school and attend college than they once were.
From 1960 to 1970, the percentage of white women, 20 to 29 years
old, who completed high school or some college rose from 66 percent
to 80 percent; among black women, the corresponding percentage
climbed from 43 percent to 63 percent.' And during the same decade
the number of women with some college education increased 160 per-
cent, as compared to 100 percent for men.2
Today young women are not only better educated, but also more
likely to live independently than they once were. From 1960 to 1970,
the proportion of adult women living alone or with unrelated room-
mates jumped 50 percent-to 7.6 million, or about 10 percent of all
adult women.' The number of women 20 to 34 years old in this cate-
gory rose at the fastest rate, more than doubling.4 By 1970 more than
10 percent of American families were headed by women5 and during
the same decade the proportion of women 20 to 24 years old who were
single climbed from 28 percent to 36 percent.6 Correspondingly, dur-
* Member of the United States House of Representatives from Michigan's
Seventeenth Congressional District.
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SOME FACTS ABOUT
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, table 13 (Apr. 1, 1971) [hereinafter cited as SOME
FACTS ABOUT WOMEN].
2. Rosenthal, For Women, a Decade of Widening Horizons, N.Y. Times, Apr.
11, 1971, at 60, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal].
3. Id.
4. SOME FACTS ABoUTz WOMEN, supra note 1, at table 8.
5. Id. at table 9.
6. Id. at table 5.
ing the 1960's the number of children born to women younger than 25
declined.7
Today women are also more likely to work outside the home than
they once were. From 1960 to 1970 the percentage of adult women
in the labor force jumped from 37 percent to more than 43 percent.8
By 1970 women comprised 38 percent of the professional and technical
labor force, as compared to 28 percent in 1950. 9
In short, today the American woman is considerably more likely
to finish high school, attend college, live alone, marry late, bear few
children, and work outside the home than she was in 1960. This is the
new image of women.
Women seek the full responsibilities and rights of citizenship, and
the courts and the legislatures should aid them in their search. In areas
of the law where progress has been made toward assuring the elimina-
tion of sex discrimination, such as the areas of employment and federal
jury service, Congress has led the way in bringing about change. But
much more federal and state legislation is needed. In addition, to set
the legislative wheels in motion and to provide constitutional protection
against sex discrimination, we need an equal rights amendment to the
Constitution.
Congressional Efforts to Eliminate Sex Discrimination
In areas of the law where progress has been made toward assuring
the elimination of sex discrimination, Congress has taken the lead in
bringing about change. Congressional involvement has been most no-
table in the areas of federal jury service and employment. The Civil
Rights Act of 195710 and the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968"
have established more equitable selection standards for the former; the
Equal Pay Act of 196312 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196413 provide broad protection against discrimination in the latter.
Jury Service
Court decisions reflect the influence of federal law in guaranteeing
7. Id. at table 11.
8. Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 60, col. 5.
9. SOME FACTS ABOUT WOMEN, supra note 1, at table 14.
10. Act of Sept. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (Supp. V, 1970).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp.
V, 1970).
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equal treatment for women in the selection of federal jurors. In Bal-
lard v. United States14 the Supreme Court reversed a California criminal
conviction because women had been intentionally and systematically
excluded from the jury panel. The Court rested its decision on Con-
gress's intent to make the federal jury a truly representative cross-sec-
tion of the community.
The systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclu-
sion of a racial group, . . . or an economic or social class . . .
deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by Con-
gress to have in our democratic society. It is a departure from the
statutory scheme.15
By the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Congress entitled women to sit
on all federal juries even where they were ineligible under state law.
The act provided that "Any citizen of the United States who has at-
tained the age of twenty-one years. . is competent to serve as a grand
or petit juror . . -. On the basis of this act, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently invalidated a jury selec-
tion procedure which discriminated on the basis of sex.y1 Potential
jurors had been drawn from a list of 350 names, 246 of which were
always men and only 104 of which were women. The court found un-
acceptable any exclusion of women from federal jury service, regard-
less of whether that exclusion is "total, as in Ballard, or only partial, a's
here . . . . Any deliberate interference-irrespective of purpose-
with a random jury selection from a list of all qualified citizens cripples
the cross-section ideal."' 8
The drive to insure equal female representation on federal juries
culminated in the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.19 Faced with
evidence of continued discrimination against women in the selection of
federal jurors, Congress expressly prohibited the exclusion of women as
a group from federal jury service."0
14. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
15. Id. at 195 (citations omitted). In 28 U.S.C. § 411 (1940) Congress had re-
quired that federal jurors have the same qualifications as those of the highest court in the
state, and California law made women eligible for jury service.
16. Act of Sept. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 152, 71 Stat. 638, as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. V, 1970).
17. United States v. Zirpolo, Nos. 18,137-18,142 (3d Cir. Feb. 18, 1971). Al-
though Zirpolo was decided after Congress explicitly prohibited sex discrimination in
the selection of federal jurors, see note 15 & accompanying text supra, that prohibi-
tion did not apply because the cause of action in Zirpolo arose prior to 1968.
18. Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (Supp. V, 1970).
20. Id. § 1862.
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Unlike those who challenge the exclusion of women from federal
juries, however, those who challenge the exclusion of women from state
juries may not rely on the federal jury statute, but must depend on the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And not until
1966, twenty years after Ballard, did any court find unconstitutional
the exclusion of women from state jury service. In White v. Crook2
a federal district court in Alabama struck down an Alabama statutory
provision which excluded all women from jury service.
Unfortunately, the decision in White v. Crook remains the exception
rather than the rule. In Hoyt v. Florida,22 for example, the United
States Supreme Court held that Florida's automatic exemption of
women from jury service, waivable only by affirmative registration for
such service, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
remained true to the traditional image of women:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restric-
tions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many
parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men,
woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. 23
And in a recent appeal from a Louisiana criminal conviction, the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana refused even to consider the charge that
women had been systematically excluded from the jury. 24 Without giv-
ing reasons for its refusal, the court flatly stated that the objection to the
jury selection procedure was "clearly without substance," citing Hoyt
v. Florida for support. 25
Employment
Congressional efforts to eliminate sex discrimination have also
concentrated on the area of employment. By the Equal Pay Act of
196326 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act 27 to require
equal pay for equal work, regardless of the sex of the worker. The
equal pay provisions forbid an employer to discriminate on the basis of
sex by paying employees of one sex at rates lower than he pays em-
ployees of the opposite sex for doing equal work on jobs requiring equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
21. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
22. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
23. Id. at 61-62.
24. State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891 (1970), cert. granted, 401
U.S. 936 (1971).
25. Id. at 950, 233 So. 2d at 894.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
27. Id. §§ 201-19.
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working conditions. 28 Moreover, an employer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of the equal pay provisions may not reduce
the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with these provisions .2
In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,80 a decision awarding almost one
million dollars in back pay and interest to about 2000 women workers,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit characterized
the Equal Pay Act as follows:
The Act was intended as a broad charter of women's rights in the
economic field. It sought to overcome the age-old belief in women's
inferiority and to eliminate the depressing effects on living stand-
ards of reduced wages for female workers and the economic and
social consequences which flow from it.31
In addition to requiring equal pay for equal work, by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196432 Congress prohibited discrimination in
hiring, in firing, and in terms, conditions, and privileges of employment
where such discrimination is based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Although Title VII contains an exception to this basic
prohibition permitting an employer to hire and employ employees on the
basis of religion, sex, or national origin "in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise,133 Congress intended this exception to be narrow in-
deed.
The case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,3" which came be-
fore the Supreme Court this year, presented the question of whether an
employer violates Title VII by refusing to hire women who have pre-
school age children while hiring men with children of the same age.
Remanding the case to the lower court for fuller development of the
record and for further consideration, the Supreme Court suggested that
"[t]he existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably
more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could
arguably be a basis for [applying the BFOQ exception]. ' '3' As Justice
Marshall stated in his concurring opinion, "the Court has fallen into the
trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about the proper
28. Id. § 206(d)(1).
29. Id.
30. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 265.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
33. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
34. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
35. Id. at 544.
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role of women to be a basis for discrimination. '36  By means of Title
VII, Congress intended to free women from discrimination in employ-
ment, not to give legislative sanction to age-old prejudices.
The difference between judicial treatment of so-called protective
labor legislation before and after the enactment of Title VII best shows
the act's effectiveness. Beginning with its 1908 decision in Muller v.
Oregon,3 7 the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that state protective
legislation for women is constitutional.38 Upholding an Oregon statute
which limited the working hours of women but not men, the Court in
Muller based its decision on the following view of women:
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been
dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by
superior physical strength, and this control in various forms, with
diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. . . . Educa-
tion was long denied her, and while now the doors of the school
room are opened and her opportunities for acquiring knowledge are
great, yet even with that and the consequent increase of capacity for
business affairs it is still true that in the struggle for subsistence she
is not an equal competitor with her brother. . . . [S]he is so con-
stituted that she will rest upon and look to him for protection .. .
her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal func-
tions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being
of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well
as the passion of man. 39
In upholding the Oregon maximum hours law, the Supreme Court "pro-
tected" women from the opportunity to earn overtime pay and from
entry into the higher-paying jobs which require overtime.
Like maximum hours legislation, minimum wage legislation which
applies only to women primarily protects not women, but men's jobs.
In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish40 the Supreme Court upheld a Wash-
ington law which fixed a minimum wage for women but not for men.
As the four dissenting justices recognized, the statute in effect denied
women "the right to compete with men for work paying lower wages
which men may be willing to accept.""1
In contrast to the Supreme Court's consistent affirmation of the
constitutionality of state protective legislation, since the enactment of
36. Id.
37. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
38. See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236
U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232
U.S. 671 (1914).
39. 208 U.S. at 421-22.
40. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
41. Id. at 412 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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Title VII courts repeatedly have held protective legislation which applies
only to women to be invalid for conflicting with Title VI 4
The Need for More Federal Legislation
Although Congress has done much to eliminate sex discrimination
in employment by passing the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, more fed-
eral legislation is still needed. Legislation should be passed which will
strengthen existing equal employment law, and action should be taken
to eliminate sex discrimination from other areas of the law.
One immediate remedy for some of the inadequacies of current
legislation would be passage of the proposed Women's Equality Act of
197 1.4  It would extend equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act (FLSA)44 to executive, administrative, and professional em-
ployees. Presently, all employees subject to a minimum wage under
the FLSA are covered-more than 45 million persons-but almost
one-half of the nation's work force has no equal pay protection.
The proposed act would also extend the coverage of Title VII.
Although Title VII generally covers employers of more than 25 employ-
ees, teachers and employees of state and local governments are specially
excepted.45 The Equality Act would insure equal employment oppor-
tunity in the hiring of state and local government employees46 and
would remove the exemption of educational institutions from equal em-
42. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Kober
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Ridinger v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Garneau v. Raytheon Co.,
3 FAr EMP. PRAc. CAs. 215 (D.C. Mass. Mar. 1, 1971); Utility Workers Local 246 v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills,
300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969). See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1969) (employer weightlifting policy, rather than state law, violates Title
VII); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (same);
Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 2 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1034 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (state
overtime law not inconsistent with Title VII, since employer may be required to elimi-
nate discrimination by paying overtime to male employees); Jones Metal Prods Co. v.
Walker, 25 Ohio App. 2d 141, 267 N.E.2d 814 (1971) (state lunch break and maximum
hours laws not inconsistent with Title VII, since if Title VII were interpreted to require
employers to provide similar benefits to male employees or to limit their hours of
employment, state statutes would not prevent employer from doing so). But see Gud-
brandson v. Genuine Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1968) (state weightlifting
law not in violation of Title VII).
43. H.R. 916, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1 (1964).
46. H.R. 916, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 14 (1971).
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ployment opportunity laws.4 7
Additionally, the Women's Equality Act would give greater power
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency created
to enforce Title VIl's prohibition of discrimination. The commission
may now seek to achieve compliance with Title VII only through nego-
tiation and conciliation, sadly inadequate enforcement tools. Authority
to bring suit is vested solely in the attorney general.48  However,
since July, 1965, when Title VII became effective, the attorney gen-
eral has filed suit to correct an instance of sex discrimination only
once.49 And that one suit was settled by a consent decree which failed
to address the issue of back pay. The proposed Women's Equality Act
would give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cease and
desist powers"° to complement the attorney general's unused complaint
procedure.
But, as mentioned earlier, this shoring-up of existing measures
will not be sufficient. There is also a pressing need for new legislation
attacking sex discrimination wherever present in federal law. For ex-
ample, Congress should insure that social security benefits be available
on an equal basis to both men and women. At present, when a wife
dies, only a husband who supplied less than half of the family's income
47. Id. at 15.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1964).
49. United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., Civ. No. C-70-212 (N.D. Ohio),
filed July 20, 1970, consent decree filed Dec. 7, 1970. In contrast to its lack of sex dis-
crimination suits, the Justice Department has filed more than 50 suits challenging in-
stances of racial discrimination. Since almost one-fifth of the complaints received by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during the fiscal year 1970 were com-
plaints of sex discrimination, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT 53 (1971), the Justice Department's failure to bring sex discrimina-
tion suits under Title VII is most puzzling.
50. H.R. 916, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 20 (1971). In addition to the purposes of
H.R. 916 discussed above, the bill inter alia has the following purposes: "to confer juris-
diction upon the district courts of the United States to provide for injunctive relief
against sex discrimination in public accommodations. . . to authorize the Attorney Gen-
eral to institute suits to eliminate sex discrimination in public facilities and public
education . . . to extend the jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Commission to include sex
discrimination . . . to prevent sex discrimination in federally assisted programs . . . to
prohibit sex discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing or in the provision
of brokerage services . . . to authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to make matching grants to States for the establishment of commissions on the status
of women . . . to require the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to make
recommendations to equalize the treatment of the sexes under the Social Security Act,
the Internal Revenue Code, and the Family Assistance Act; and to require the Com-
missioner of Education to conduct a survey and report to Congress on the denial of equal
educational opportunity because of sex and make recommendations to eliminate such
denial."
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during the wife's lifetime may draw on his wife's social security.5 But
any wife, even the independently wealthy, may claim her husband's
benefits. 52 The question of whether a surviving spouse should be enti-
tled to claim the deceased spouse's social security benefits logically
might rest on an evaluation of the surviving spouse's need, but for it to
rest on the surviving spouse's sex is irrational. To correct this inequity,
I have introduced in the Ninety-second Congress two bills which would
eliminate the special dependency requirement for entitlement to widower's
social security benefits. 53
In addition to denying a self-supporting widower the right to his
deceased wife's social security benefits, the present social security law
negates a working wife's contributions to social security in another
way. A working wife pays into social security on exactly the same
basis as her working husband. But a working wife may not draw on
both her husband's entitlement and her own unless hers is less than one
half of his.54 Moreover, the husband of a working wife may not
draw on her entitlement unless his is less than one half of hers55
and the husband shows that at least half of his support came from his
wife.55 If both husband and wife have worked at fairly low incomes,
they may have paid as much or more in social security taxes than the
man who was the sole family earner and paid at the top base, but they
will draw less than the amount going to that man and his nonearning
wife. To correct this unfairness, I have introduced in the 92d Con-
gress a bill which would permit the payment of social security benefits
to a married couple on their combined earnings record.57
Similarly, benefits which accompany federal employment or mili-
tary service should not be conferred or denied on the basis of sex. Ben-
efits should be available on the same basis to the family of a female em-
ployee as they are to the family of a male employee. Therefore, I have
introduced in the Ninety-second Congress bills to provide for the treat-
ment of the husbands, widowers, and children of female federal employ-
ees on an equal basis with the wives, widows, and children of male fed-
eral employees with respect to: (1) compensation for employees' work
injuries; 8 (2) annuities available to the surviving spouses of deceased
51. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1964).
52. See id. § 402(e).
53. H.R. 3288 & 3289, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
54. 20 C.F.R. § 404.313(a)(4) (1971).
55. Id. § 404.316(a) (4).
56. Id. § 404.316(a)(3).
57. H.R. 3289, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
58. H.R. 3626, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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foreign service employees; 59 and (3) preference eligible employment
benefits available to spouses of deceased and disabled veterans, cost-of-
living allowances in foreign areas, and regulations generally. 60 In ad-
dition, I have introduced bills to make medical care, dental care, and
allowances available to the dependents of female members of the uni-
formed services on the same basis that they are available to the depend-
ents of male members;6 and to make veterans' benefits available to the
husbands and widowers of female veterans on the same basis that they
are available to the wives and widows of male veterans.62
Tax law is another area of federal law which fails to reflect the
new image of women. Although the Internal Revenue Code per se does
not discriminate between men and women, it does permit a child care
deduction for a family with an income of less than $6,000 per year.63
Deductions for child care should be available to all. In addition, the
expense of employing domestic help should be deductible. We allow
deductions for business employees, thus in effect helping to pay the
salaries of the employed.6" But we refuse to help pay the wages of
those who are employed as domestics, most of whom are women. If
the expense of employing domestic help were deductible, women em-
ployed as domestics would receive higher pay, and their social security
would be paid because their employers would insist.
The Importance of An Equal Rights Amendment
Because sex discrimination is so deeply and extensively ingrained
in our legal system, federal legislation alone cannot assure its elimina-
tion. An equal rights amendment to the Constitution is needed. In its
essential language, the amendment which has been proposed provides that
"[equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex."65  Congress
should approve this proposal and send it to the states for ratification.
59. H.R. 3627, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
60. H.R. 3628, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The House passed H.R. 3628 on
August 2, 1971. 117 CONG. REC. H7640 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1971).
61. H.R. 2580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
62. H.R. 3965, 92d Cong., 1st Sess (1971).
63. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 214.
64. Id. § 162(a).
65. H.R.J. Res. 208. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1971). On October 12, 1971,
the House passed the amendment by a vote of 354 to 23. 117 CONG. REC. H9392 (daily
ed. Oct. 12, 1971). During the 91st Congress in August 1970 the equal rights amend-
ment passed the House by the overwhelming vote of 350 to 15. However, during the
91st Congress the amendment never reached a final vote in the Senate.
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The equal rights amendment would create a firm national policy
against sex discrimination, thereby requiring changes in federal law
which, if attempted without unifying impetus and direction, might take
decades. Moreover, it would assure the elimination of sex discrimina-
tion more completely than federal legislation ever could, for, unlike
federal legislation, the equal rights amendment would directly require
state legislatures to revise discriminatory state laws. Unequal treatment
of men and women in all areas of state law would have to be modified
in accordance with the national policy of sex equality developed under
the equal rights amendment. States could no longer confer or deny
rights and responsibilities on the basis of sex. 66
In addition, the amendment would provide constitutional protec-
tion against sex discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment to our
Constitution already provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This clause
would seem to forbid state action which discriminates between men and
women, but the Supreme Court has not found such action unconstitu-
tional. 7 The equal rights amendment would guarantee constitutional
protection against sex discrimination.
While the Supreme Court has been unwilling to depart from the
traditional image of women, other courts have held sex discrimination
to be unconstitutional. Judicial disagreement over the constitutionality
of laws governing the selection of state jurors already has been dis-
cussed.68 Disagreement over the unconstitutionality of state action
which discriminates on the basis of sex also surrounds the issues of ex-
cluding members of one sex from state-supported universities and ex-
cluding women from certain occupations.
Just eleven years ago, in Allred v. Heaton69 the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals held that the exclusion of women from Texas A. &. M., the
third largest state-supported university in Texas, did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And one of the
66. For discussions of the need for and the legal effects of the equal ights
amendment see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment:
A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yn L.J. 871 (1971); Dorsen
& Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. I.
Ruv. 216 (1971); Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HA.v. Civ.
RIrHTS-Civ. LiB. L Rav. 225 (1971).
67. But see Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (dis-
tinguished in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (overruled by West Coast, supra).
68. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
69. 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960).
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plaintiffs in Allred sought a degree offered at no other college or uni-
versity in Texas. To support its decision, the court noted the history of
Texas A. & M. as a men's school and the existence of 17 other state-sup-
ported colleges and universities in Texas, all of which were open to
women. The court also relied on the status of Texas A. & M. as a mili-
tary school, apparently ignoring the lower court's finding that "about
3500 students of [Texas A. & M.] are now not required to study to be
connected with military or air training. "70
In contrast to Allred v. Heaton, in 1970 a federal district court in
Virginia held in Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Vir-
ginia 7 1 that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause for-
bids Virginia to "deny to women, on the basis of sex, educational op-
portunities at the Charlottesville campus that are not afforded in other
institutions operated by the state." 72 Like Texas A. & M., the University
of Virginia at Charlottesville had a long history as a men's school.
And like Texas, Virginia supported numerous other colleges and uni-
versities which were open to women.
The Supreme Court refused to review the decision in Allred v.
Heaton and the University of Virginia did not appeal the Kirstein deci-
sion. 73  But this year the Supreme Court reaffirmed the trend of its
past thinking. In Williams v. McNair74 the Federal District Court of
South Carolina held that the exclusion of men from state-supported
Winthrop College did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause. Although the district court rested its decision on the
merit of the theory that "a single-sex institution can advance the quality
and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating upon areas of pri-
mary interest to only one sex," 7 5 the court did not suggest that Winthrop
College had in fact engaged in "educational specialization." In fact,
the court found the argument of the male plaintiffs weak because it
failed to suggest "that there is any special feature connected with
Winthrop that will make it more advantageous educationally to them
70. Id. at 253.
71. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
72. Id. at 187. The court went on to observe that "Unquestionably the facilities
at Charlottesville do offer courses of instruction that are not available elsewhere. Fur-
thermore, . . . there exists at Charlottesville a 'prestige' factor that is not available at
other Virginia educational institutions." Id.
73. At the time Kirstein was decided, the University of Virginia had agreed to a
plan under which women eventually would be admitted at Charlottesville on an equal
basis with men.
74. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mein., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
75. Id. at 137.
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than any number of other State-supported institutions."7 6  By suggest-
ing that the policy of sex discrimination would have been less justified
if Winthrop had engaged in education specialization, the court contra-
dicted its conclusion that the theory of educational specialization justi-
fied Winthrop's policy of sex discrimination. Since the Supreme Court
affirmed Williams v. McNair77 without opinion, it is impossible to know
whether or not the Court would find the exclusion of the members of
one sex from a state-supported university constitutional under all cir-
cumstances.
Like the exclusion of the members of one sex from state-supported
universities, the exclusion of women from occupations7 is a muddy
area of constitutional law. In Goesaert v. Cleary,79 decided in 1948,
the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan statute which provided that no
woman could be licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or
daughter of the male tavern owner. The Court found no denial of equal
protection. In fact, the Court commented that Michigan could deny
bartender licenses to all women:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working
behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and
legal position of women. The fact that women may now have
achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives
and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not pre-
clude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes
80
In spite of Goesaert, during the past two years several municipal
ordinances prohibiting the employment of women as bartenders have
been struck down as unconstitutional. In Paterson Tavern & Grill
Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne"' the Supreme Court of New
76. Id. at 138.
77. 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
78. Through 1969, seventeen states prohibited by law the employment of women
in or about mines. Nine states prohibited the employment of women as bartenders.
And eleven states prohibited the employment of women in miscellaneous other places
or occupations, or under certain conditions. WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BuLL. No. 294, 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 277-78.
79. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
80. Id. at 465-66.
81. 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970); accord, Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,
485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (striking down a California female bartender
statute); McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 FAro EMI. PRAc. CAS. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (Chicago
ordinance prohibiting the employment of women as bartenders violates due process
clause of fourteenth amendment & Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Jarosak v.
City of Minneapolis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] 63 Lab. Cas. f 9457 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1969) (similar ordinance violates due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth
amendment).
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Jersey struck down a municipal ordinance which prohibited taverns from
employing female bartenders, holding that "in the light of current cus-
toms and mores, the municipal restriction against female bartending
may no longer fairly be viewed as a necessary and reasonable exercise
of the police power."8 -2 The court noted that although early New Jer-
sey decisions had upheld prohibitions against female bartenders, those
cases "arose in a different social and moral climate when judges, along
with others, entertained Victorian ideas as to women and their proper
place in the scheme of things. 8
3
Unfortunately, many judges still entertain "Victorian ideas as to
women and their proper place in the scheme of things." And so do
many legislators. To initiate and coordinate the revision of all laws
and official practices that discriminate on the basis of sex, and to pro-
vide for constitutional protection against sex discrimination, we need
an equal rights amendment to the Constitution.
Conclusion
In sum, the law must reflect the new image of women. Today
women do not function solely as homemakers and protected followers.
Today women are providers, protectors, and leaders. No longer should
legal rights and responsibilities be denied on the basis of sex.
Legislatures have enacted laws designed to eliminate sex discrimi-
nation in some areas, especially in employment and federal jury service.
But much more legislation, both state and federal, is needed. Most
importantly, to set the legislative wheels in motion and to guide the
legislative effort, we need an equal rights amendment to the Constitu-
tion. The Constitution should protect against discrimination on the
basis of sex.
82. 57 N.J. at 186, 270 A.2d at 631.
83. Id. at 183, 270 A.2d at 630.
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